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Abstract 
The escalation of the violent conflict in Sri Lanka since 2006 has put the spotlight on the role 
torture played as a military strategy against the LTTE. Despite Sri Lanka being a State Party 
to major United Nations treaties on human rights, the Sri Lankan government secretly used 
torture to gain confessions, intelligence and to punish the LTTE. Torture techniques were 
brutal, including burnings with soldering irons, beatings and electric shocks. How was this 
use of torture possible? Using a discursive practices approach, I examine how a ‘reality’ was 








In May 2009, the decades-long conflict in Sri Lanka between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE) and the Sri Lankan government came to an end. Sri Lankan President 
Mahinda Rajapaksa declared in his victory speech that the Sri Lankan military had freed the 
country from the clutches of the most powerful terrorist organisation in the world (Rajapaksa 
2009b).  Victory was attributed to the humane conduct of the Sri Lankan military: ‘Our 
valiant troops went to battle carrying the gun in one hand, the Charter of Human Rights in the 
other, and their hearts filled with love for their children’ (Rajapaksa 2009b). However, 
despite these pronouncements, the war was plagued by widespread human rights violations, 
war crimes, and torture on both sides (see U.N. Secretary-General 2011). The United Nations 
Special Rapporteur on Torture visited Sri Lanka from 1-8 October 2008 and found that 
torture had become routine in counter-terrorist operations (U.N. Human Rights Council 2008: 
19-20).           
 The widespread use of torture stands in contrast to the extensive laws in Sri Lanka 
that prohibit torture. Torture was first abolished in Sri Lanka in 1799 by the then British 
colonial rulers (Amnesty International 1999: 3). Since that time, the prohibition against 
torture has been implemented in major national laws. Article 11 of the Sri Lankan 
constitution states ‘No person shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment’ (U.N. Human Rights Council 2008: 11). Article 15 reinforces 
Article 11 by prohibiting any derogation in times of state emergencies (U.N. Human Rights 
Council 2008: 11). The Sri Lankan Penal Code criminalises acts that come within the U.N. 
Convention against Torture, while the Torture Act (1994) prohibits torture (U.N. Human 
Rights Council 2008: 12, 21). Sri Lanka has implemented other legal safeguards such as a 
complaints and compensation process for those who have been victim to torture, and several 
commissions that can investigate allegations of torture.
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 In addition, Sri Lanka is party to 
several major international treaties that prohibit torture.
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 Taking into account these prohibitions, how was torture made possible? This paper is 
interested in this how-possible question, i.e., I am not so much concerned with why the Sri 
Lankan government tortured, as to how it was possible for the Sri Lankan government to 
torture. The former question looks at causation, while the latter is concerned with constitution 
(Wendt 1998: 104-105). The distinction is important for several reasons. Why-questions tend 
to focus on the beliefs and intentions of actors and show how under certain circumstances, an 
outcome was predictable (Doty 1993: 298). These types of questions provide important 
insight, but in some respects, do not tell the whole story. They take the actor as given, and 
assume that a practice could take place (Doty 1993: 298). How-possible questions take the 
subjects as problematic, paying attention to the social construction of subjects and reality and 
how this construction allows for the possibility of practices (Doty 1993: 298).  
 This article argues that certain discursive constructions made it possible for Sri 
Lankan forces to use torture as a practice to help win the war against the LTTE. Focusing 
predominately on the Sri Lankan government, I show how the Rajapaksa government drew 
upon terrorist and Sinhalese nationalist discourse to cast the 2006-2009 war as a battle for the 
survival of Sri Lanka. I examine government speeches, peace and reconciliation reports and 
interviews to show how these two discourses intertwined to cast the LTTE as a group beyond 
negotiation and one that needed to be destroyed. The nationalist discourses further 
exacerbated the violence against Tamils by ranking them in an inferior position in relation to 
the majority of Sinhalese. In addition to the suspension of civil liberties under emergency 
legislation, these discursive practices helped encourage torture and other forms of violence.
 I have divided this article into several parts. The first section looks at the problem of 
torture in Sri Lanka and analyses the psychodynamic and discursive practices approach to 
help understand the possibility of torture. I then look at the role nationalist myths and 
discourses on terrorism played in creating an environment where violence and torture was 
deemed possible and necessary to save Sri Lanka. Finally I examine how this national 
discourse encouraged the escalation of violence among Sri Lankan officials against LTTE 
fighters.  
 
The Problem of Torture 
Torture has been employed against many different ethnic groups in Sri Lanka’s history. 
When the Marxist Janatha Vimukthi Perumana (JVP) led a violent revolt in April 1971, the 
government employed torture to gain information and identify JVP supporters (Abeysekara 
2001: 35-43; Amnesty International 1973: 150-151). Yet in recent years it has been the Tamil 
community, and the LTTE, that have been the primary victims of torture. Amnesty 
International reported in 1984 that the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) has 
systematically employed torture against the LTTE for information and confessions (Amnesty 
International 1984: 200). During the recent 2006-2009 war, although the LTTE too used 
torture (U.N. Secretary-General 2011: 67), they were also the primary targets of torture by 
the Sri Lankan government. In 2008 a visit by the U.N. Rapporteur on Torture to Sri Lanka 
found torture by the army and police to be widespread and routine in ‘counter-terrorism 
operations’ (U.N. Human Rights Council 2008: 20). This was based on the wide number of 
torture cases documented by the Rapporteur as well as the attempts by the Terrorist 
Investigation Department (TID) to obstruct the work of the Rapporteur and hide evidence of 
torture (U.N. Human Rights Council 2008: 20). Torture methods included  
beatings on the soles of the feet (falaqa), blows to the ears (telephono), positional 
abuse when handcuffed or bound, suspension in various positions, including 
strappado, “butchery”, “reversed butchery” and “parrot’s perch” (or dharma 
chakara), burning with metal objects and cigarettes, asphyixiation with plastic bags 
with chilli pepper or gasoline, and various forms of genital torture (U.N. Human 
Rights Council 2008: 20).
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A 2011 U.N. report into allegations of war crimes during the war found the government 
employed the elite Special Task Force (STF) within the Sri Lankan police to use white vans 
to ‘abduct and often disappear critics of the Government or those suspected of links with the 
LTTE, and, more generally, to instil fear into the population’ (U.N. Secretary-General 2011: 
17). Victims were then taken to secret locations and subjected to torture such as ‘beatings, 
forced nudity, suffocation with plastic bags, partial drowning, extraction of finger or toe 
nails, or administering electric shocks. Many were killed and their bodies disposed of 
secretly’ (U.N. Secretary-General 2011: 17). Despite the fact the recent war ended in May 
2009, allegations of torture have continued to emerge as Sri Lankan police and military 
forces seek to find remaining LTTE members (Freedom from Torture 2011; Human Rights 
Watch 2013).           
 How are we to explain this use of violence? A dominant explanation of mass violence 
has been through the psychodynamic literature. Although this provides powerful insights, I 
argue in and of itself it cannot adequately explain the use of torture in Sri Lanka. I argue a 
discursive practices approach helps ameliorate the shortcomings of psychodynamic 
explanations by analysing the social construction of actors and the discursive construction of 
an environment that contributed to torture. This helped justify emergency legislation that 
suspended civil liberties and helped create a culture of impunity among Sri Lankan officials.  
 
 
Psychodynamic Approach  
Psychodynamic approaches have been popular in explaining the use of mass violence and 
torture in ethnic and racial conflicts (Casoni and Brunet 2007; Kernberg 1998, 2003a, 2003b; 
Volkan 2009). Building on the work of Freud, psychodynamic approaches focus on the 
unconscious drives of egos to explain de-humanisation and its effects. Psychodynamic 
theorists dismiss the idea that an ‘objective’ reality exists ‘out there’ and brings to the fore the 
social construction of reality. This means that during times of conflict, a group’s enemy does 
not exist a priori to the self, but is socially constructed in relation to the self.  
 How is the self and other created? One means is through projection whereby we 
project unwanted images of ourselves onto others (Murer 2009: 115-116; Volkan 2009). 
Another means is through abjection. This is where we reject a former part of ourselves and 
the Other becomes a prohibition that is excluded from engagement to prevent the new self 
regressing and adopting its former unwanted qualities (Murer 2009: 118). These complex 
psychodynamic processes can result in a refusal to identify with others and lead to 
identificatory disengagement, i.e., where other human beings are seen as inferior and non-
human (Casoni and Brunet 2007: 277).       
 Psychodynamic approaches explain these unconscious processes in a group context, 
focusing on how individuals give up their psychic functioning to the group, influencing 
individuals who would normally not engage in violence to become perpetrators (Casoni and 
Brunet 2007: 269). The group’s beliefs and the individual’s beliefs are now one; the group 
thinks for the individual, defines boundaries of morality, and who is included within those 
boundaries (Casoni and Brunet 2007: 270). These group processes also incorporate trans-
generational transmission of trauma, whereby a historical trauma is ‘deposited’ in future 
generations, carrying with it the emotions of humiliation or injustice (Volkan 2001: 87-88). 
Volkan (2001: 92-95) examines how Slobodan Milosevic invoked a 600 year old trauma of 
the 1389 Battle of Kosovo and its consequences. Volkan (2001: 92-95) argues that this 
historical trauma helped invoke shame and humiliation among the Serbian population and 
contribute to the violence perpetrated by Milosevic.      
 What can the psychodynamic approach contribute to understanding torture in the 
recent Sri Lanka conflict? Although it provides a powerful insight into the different tensions 
and violence between ethnic groups in Sri Lanka, it does not explain how Sinhalese often 
tortured other Sinhalese, or how the LTTE was willing to kill and torture the very Tamils 
they were allegedly representing and protecting. By taking subjects as given, psychodynamic 
theorists do not adequately account for the construction and reconstruction of identities that 
make conditions for torture possible.        
 And second, psychodynamic approaches become problematic when one tries to 
measure and objectify unconscious beliefs. If a person does not even know what goes on 
inside their own head, it becomes difficult for an outsider to analyse a person’s unconscious 
(Weldes and Saco 1996: 371). Psychodynamic theorists, similar to other psychological 
approaches, assume behaviour by making correlations between the supposed unconscious 
beliefs and behaviour (Weldes and Saco 1996: 371). As I show with a discursive practices 
approach, this methodology is unnecessary. 
 
Discursive Practices Approach  
The psychodynamic approach, by itself, is unable to explain the question of torture during the 
Sri Lankan war. However, I do not dismiss its value. What I would like to contribute is how a 
discursive practices approach can help address these short comings and provide a more 
powerful analysis. How does a discursive practices approach help understand the use of 
torture during the Sri Lankan conflict?       
 A discursive practices approach takes the focus away from the unconscious thoughts 
and beliefs of the individual/collective subject. Instead, a discursive practices approach uses 
an inter-subjective methodology that focuses on the role of language in constructing reality 
(see Der Derian 1990; Doty 1993, 1996; Skonieczny 2001; Weldes and Saco 1996). Rather 
than using unconscious thoughts as the starting point, this approach begins with language by 
showing beliefs of individuals are not meaningful or possible without shared language 
(Weldes and Saco 1996: 371). As Doty (1993: 302-303) notes, discourses provide discursive 
spaces such as concepts, metaphors, or categories that help create ‘reality’ and make certain 
practices possible.          
 A discursive practices approach brings to the fore the fact that discourse has 
productive power. By this is meant that in creating knowledge and meaning, discourse 
produces actors and identities and shapes action (Doty 1993; Weldes and Saco 1996: 372). 
However, discourse is not ‘controlled’ by anyone (Skonieczny 2001: 438). Discourse is an 
open, historically contingent autonomous field that operates at its own level (Foucault 2002: 
137, 141). Because of the structure of discourse, meanings are infinite and expanding (Doty 
1993: 302). Statements do not refer back to a signifier but refer to other statements. As 
Foucault (2002: 111) argues, statements border other statements, each statement has a status, 
and their relationship between one another determines their meaning. This means that 
identities are fluid, as actors are constructed and are articulated within a particular discourse 
(Doty 1993: 302-303).         
 An important qualification is needed here. In saying that discourse constructs reality, I 
do not imply that the world is nothing more than imagination, myths or ideas without a 
corresponding reality. The LTTE and the Sri Lankan government exist in a brute manner; 
they have fought one another resulting in the deaths of thousands of people; and both sides 
have engaged in torture. Rather, through systems of signification, a discursive practices 
approach makes the ontological assumption that material things by themselves do not convey 
meaning; rather, people inter-subjectively provide meaning to material things through sign 
systems. What is constructed here is the ideas that form actor identities; the hierarchical 
relationship between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government; and the counterinsurgency 
‘reality’ that shapes the possibility of practices.  The relationship in which things are given 
meaning is allocated great importance because it generates relations that help distinguish one 
object from another (Milliken 1999: 229).       
 By taking identities as fluid one can see how the Sinhalese government could torture 
other Sinhalese and the LTTE could torture Tamils. Moreover, focusing on discourses also 
means one does not have to assume behaviour from unconscious processes. But what kind of 
discourses can help understand the government use of torture in the recent war against the 
LTTE? I have identified two discourses: nationalist myths and the discourses of terrorism. I 
address each in turn.           
 Nationalist myths were invoked by both the Rajapaksa government and the LTTE to 
justify their violence and help understand the war. Sri Lanka is a culturally and religiously 
diverse country which has often led to ethnic tensions. Sri Lanka comprises of a majority of 
Sinhalese (74%) who are mostly Buddhist, Tamil (18%) who are predominately Hindu, 
Muslims (7%) and Burghers and Vehhahs (1%)  (U.N. Secretary-General 2011: 7). Post-
oriental scholars argue that the current ethnic tensions in Sri Lanka derive from the British 
colonial constructions of different ethnicities in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
(Rogers 1994; Rogers 2004). The dominant nationalism on the island is Sinhalese 
nationalism, which emerged in response to the ‘corrupting’ influence of colonialism and the 
claim to be the rightful rulers of Sri Lanka (Brow 1988: 316; Roberts 1978: 373). Despite 
many ethnicities on the island, Sinhalese nationalism claims Sri Lanka is an island for the 
Sinhalese. As DeVotta (2011: 135) notes, Rajapaksa and the current Sri Lankan leadership 
‘subscribe to an ideology which claims that Sri Lanka is a designated sanctuary of Theravada 
Buddhism, that Sinhalese Buddhists are the chosen custodians to preserve and propagate this 
legacy, that all others who live on the island do so thanks purely to Sinhalese Buddhist 
sufferance, and that only traitors would seek to undermine Sinhalese Buddhist dominance.’
 The claim that Sri Lanka is an island for the Sinhalese helps to de-legitimise Tamil 
claims to ownership of the Northern parts of the island. The Tamil population are seen to 
already have a homeland in Tamil Nadu in India, and are viewed within Sinhalese nationalist 
ideology as unjustly claiming land from the Sinhalese, who have nowhere else but Sri Lanka 
to call home (DeVotta 2011: 135).          
 Contemporary Sinhalese nationalism draws upon many of these myths and is worked 
on through political speeches, the media, ‘planting and harvest rituals’ and educational 
institutions (Brow 1988: 316). As Skonieczny (2001: 439) has shown, ‘myths are important 
in forming and solidifying a national identity and are often utilized and deployed by policy-
makers to generate support and elevate the national importance of policy.’ In Sri Lanka 
national leaders invoke the virtue of former Sinhalese Kings, who are idolised as the 
guardians of the island, to legitimise their authority and policies (Brow 1988: 312-316). 
National leaders are seen to be in charge of protecting Buddhist principles, but also 
sovereignty, economic development and Sri Lankan way of life (Brow 1988: 316). This is 
particularly true of farmers, who are epitomised as an important part of culture on the island 
(Brow 1988: 316; see also Rampton 2011: 260).      
 The second major discourse is fighting terrorism. The term ‘terrorism’ was first 
applied to the Sinhalese JVP which engaged in violence in the south of the country to achieve 
its demands of social change (Nadarajah and Sriskandarajah 2005: 89). However, more 
recently it has been used against the LTTE. Tensions between the Sinhalese and Tamils 
began to erupt after independence. When the Sinhalese felt that the Tamil community had a 
disproportionate number of positions in government services, an upsurge of Sinhalese 
nationalism resulted in discriminatory policies to favour the Sinhalese majority (Kearney 
1964: 125; Roberts 1978: 367). This included the Sinhala Only Act, which made Sinhala the 
official language of the country (Roberts 1978: 368).  Protests erupted in the Tamil 
community as they perceived these policies as discriminatory and harming job opportunities 
for Tamils in Sri Lanka (Manoharan 2006: 13-14).      
 When grievances were not met, the Tamil minority called for independence from Sri 
Lanka, claiming parts of the North-East of the island as their own. Violence erupted in 1983 
when the LTTE killed 13 Sri Lankan soldiers (Nadarajah and Sriskandarajah 2005: 89). The 
Sri Lankan Government has since been in repeated conflict with the LTTE (see 
Samaranayake 1999). In the history of the conflict between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan 
government, the label ‘terrorism’ has had three effects: it has de-legitimised the Tamil 
project; generated domestic Sinhalese support for government actions; and helped the 
government gain international support (Nadarajah and Sriskandarajah 2005: 91). The label of 
terrorism was used to associate the LTTE with the broader Tamil demands for a new state 
(Nadarajah and Sriskandarajah 2005: 89). Therefore, the destruction of one also became the 
destruction of the other. As I show below, these two discourses – nationalist myths and 
terrorism – have become intertwined and have helped create conditions that have made 
torture possible.  
 
Counter-Insurgency and Torture?  
An ideal site in which to see how discourse can make torture possible is in counter-
insurgency operations. Since World War II, counterinsurgency operations have become the 
dominant form of warfare for many governments around the world (Long 2006; Metz and 
Millen 2004). These operations consist of a battle between insurgents and governments that 
seek to ‘control contested political space’ (Kilcullen 2006a: 112). Insurgent tactics are used 
by groups who are unable to obtain their political objectives through conventional means 
(Long 2006: 2). Counterinsurgency, then, is the ‘military, paramilitary, political, economic, 
psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency’ (U.S. 
Department of the Army 2006, 1: 1).       
 However, counter-insurgency is not just concerned with defeating insurgents who 
pose a threat to the government’s authority and to the social order more generally. Rather, it 
has a broader function of establishing overall control over society (Kilcullen 2006b: 6). 
Counter-insurgency is a fight for legitimacy (U.S. Department of the Army 2006, 1: 21). It 
involves winning the hearts and minds of the population, as each side attempts to mobilise the 
population to support its cause (Kilcullen 2006a: 117; Long 2006: 21-24). A U.S. Department 
of the Army manual (2006, 1: 23) argues that as the host government gains legitimacy in the 
eyes of the population, the latter isolate the insurgents and come to see the insurgent group as 
illegitimate. Victory occurs ‘not when this isolation is achieved, but when the victory is 
permanently maintained by and with the people’s active support and when insurgent forces 
have been defeated.’ Victory seeks to monopolise a particular interpretation of reality and 
consolidate the victor’s authority.        
 The struggle for legitimacy also makes counter-insurgency an ideal site to study the 
construction of identities. One of the fundamental functions of counter-insurgency is the 
management of the representation of the ‘enemy’ as a threat to society. This is what Kilcullen 
(2006a: 123) has called ‘political warfare:’ regulating the perception of identities among the 
population. For counter-insurgents, they promote favourable perceptions of themselves, while 
publicising insurgent violence and discrediting insurgent propaganda (U.S. Department of the 
Army 2006, 5: 2). It is through this process of identity construction that the insurgent is 
deemed illegitimate and dangerous. For the counter-insurgent, it must manage and regulate 
the social order, representing it as natural and beneficial for the population while, at the same 
time, managing and controlling the identity of the insurgent as a dangerous threat to society.
 Although this helps explain how the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE attempted 
to frame one another as dangerous, it does not explain the use of torture. In public addresses 
to the international and domestic community, the Sri Lankan government stated it practiced 
the war in a humane fashion and that it was the LTTE that engaged in barbaric human rights 
violations. The Sri Lankan government never publicly condoned torture and denied its use. 
The Rajapaksa government submitted a report to the U.N. Committee against Torture in 2010 
stating,  
Sri Lanka also notes the Committee’s statement that no exceptional circumstances 
whatsoever may be invoked as a justification for torture. Despite the grave atrocities 
committed by the LTTE, the Government reiterates that it has at no time sought to 
invoke any justification for torture nor has it resorted to or acquiesced in acts of 
torture. As a matter of State policy and practice, the Government maintains a zero 
tolerance policy on torture, as is evidenced by the meaningful measures taken to curb 
acts of torture (U.N. Committee against Torture 2010: 6).  
If counter-insurgency is about gaining legitimacy, how was torture possible? As I show, the 
discourses of nationalist myths and the threat of terrorism helped to justify a transgression of 
the CFA and return to war with the LTTE. This created an extra-ordinary environment that 
helped justify emergency laws. These laws provided the Sri Lankan army and police forces 
with an environment of impunity and the necessary cover to engage in torture. The above 
statement to the U.N. Committee against Torture demonstrates a discourse of un-truth, 
whereby the Sri Lankan government promoted a positive image of themselves for a domestic 
and international audience, and then engaged in illegal practices that were deemed militarily 
useful in winning the war.          
 In analysing the recent war I have selected documents between 2006 and 2010 such as 
public statements, interviews, international speeches, and government documents that made 
reference to the war and post-war reconstruction. I have used English translations for all 
documents; however, many of the speeches were delivered in Sinhalese, with some being 
delivered in both Tamil and Sinhalese. These documents had several different audiences. 
Firstly, the Sri Lankan government sought to justify themselves to the international 
community by linking their war with the LTTE to the global ‘war on terror.’ Secondly, they 
addressed the Sinhalese community and sought to gain their support by invoking Sinhalese 
historical myths and narratives. And the third audience was the Tamil community. The 
government equated the destruction of the LTTE with the broader Tamil separatist project 
and therefore used war propaganda to destroy the idea of a separate Tamil state.   
 When examining the documents and speeches I have drawn upon Doty’s (1993) work 
in focusing in particular on the importance predications, presuppositions and subject 
positioning have in interpreting discourse. Predicates are the attributes attached to an object, 
such as ‘humane’ or ‘terrorist’ (Doty 1993: 306). Presuppositions refer to background 
knowledge and help statements make sense (Doty 1993: 306). And subject positioning places 
actors in a hierarchical relationship which allocates the actor’s agency (Doty 1993: 308). 
These three tools ‘provide analytic categories that enable me to get at how discursive 
practices constitute subjects and objects and organize them into a “grid of intelligibility’” 




Returning to War   
In order to examine how torture became possible during the recent Sri Lankan conflict, one 
must analyse the discursive environment that was constructed to legitimise and gain support 
for the return to war against the LTTE. I argue that the two discourses mentioned above were 
responsible: namely, invoking nationalist myths and the discourses of terrorism. Both sides in 
the conflict invoked these discourses and they helped shape a reality that opened up a 
possibility of practices while closing others. These national discourses were the leading 
element in creating an environment that made torture possible as they invoked age-old myths 
that provided the government’s discourse with legitimacy in the eyes of the domestic 
Sinhalese population. Yet they also invoked wider international discourses on terrorism that 
linked and attempted to legitimise the Sri Lankan conflict with the wider ‘war on terror’ and 
associated government victory with freedom for the Tamil community. This made the use of 
violence against the LTTE possible as well as create an environment for the escalation of 
violence and de-humanisation of state enemies at the local level. Although I have separated 
these two discourses for analytical reasons, as one will see, these two discourses are heavily 
intertwined.  
 
‘Defending’ Sri Lanka  
Nationalism became a prominent theme used by both sides to make sense of the conflict and 
justify violence against each other and their own ethnic groups. The recent Sri Lankan war 
represented a battle over the identity and future of the Sri Lankan island. One point at which 
this contestation surrounded was the question of sovereignty. The Sri Lankan government 
grafted its identity to Sri Lankan sovereignty whereby one was akin to the other. The Acting 
Minister for External Affairs, Gitanjana Gunawardena, stated ‘Every State has an equal right 
to defend itself against threats to its Sovereignty, whether the threat emanates from within its 
own territory or from outside’ (Gunawardena 2010). By linking the defence of the 
government with the defence and unity of Sri Lankan sovereignty it excluded the possibility 
of sharing or demarking sovereignty unless the government itself faced defeat.   
 In linking sovereignty as a key constitutive element of Sri Lankan government 
identity, the Rajapaksa government also associated itself with defence of the population, 
since it is the people that are the true holders of sovereignty in a modern democratic polity. 
Addressing an international audience, Rajapaksa declared in a 2008 speech to the 63rd
 
United 
Nations General Assembly,   
What the Government would not, and could not do is to let an illegal and armed 
terrorist group, the LTTE, to hold a fraction of our population, a part of the Tamil 
community, hostage to such terror in the northern part of Sri Lanka and deny those 
people their democratic rights of dissent and free elections (Rajapaksa 2008b). 
This speech was directed at the international community to legitimise both its military 
intervention against the LTTE, but also to reinforce the government position that Sri Lanka is 
a unified whole and will not tolerate separatist claims to its sovereignty. It is important to 
note that Tamils were deemed a population within Sri Lanka, not a population of their own. 
Yet these discursive strategies also dissociated the LTTE as being representative of the Tamil 
community by associating the LTTE with authoritarian rule. By virtue of dissociating the 
LTTE from the broader Tamil population, the Sri Lankan government came to adopt the 
sovereign will of all people living within Sri Lanka. The state was deemed the protector of all 
in Sri Lanka and whereby the nation and the state were deemed to be unified as well. 
 The LTTE were represented by the Sri Lankan government to the international 
community as a foreign element in Sri Lanka, undermining its democratic processes and 
generating ethnic tensions. Rohitha Bogollagama (2008c), the Sri Lankan foreign minister, 
stated at the BIMSTEC meeting on the 12 November 2008, ‘Sri Lanka has been facing a 
tremendous challenge to our democratic way of life through the barbaric actions of a terrorist 
group, the LTTE.’ Yet the LTTE were also responsible for the ethnic troubles of the island. 
The government accused the LTTE of disrupting ‘the multi-cultural, multi-religious society 
that we have built up, and preserved in Sri Lanka for over centuries’ (Bogollagama 2008a). 
Addressing the U.N. in 2008, the government invoked historical tales of how the Tamil and 
Sinhalese once lived in harmony, and LTTE attacks were violating this tradition: 
A former Attorney General of then Ceylon, Sir Ponnambalam Ramanathan, also a 
loved Tamil politician, in September 1904, had this to say at a public meeting in 
Colombo. (I quote) “I have been to many countries in the world. But, no where have I 
seen such a friendly race as the Sinhalese who also uphold high moral values.” 
(unquote). Such was the harmony between the Tamils and the Sinhalese. But a 
malicious group has turned all of this upside down (Rajapaksa 2008b). 
Government discourses constructed a narrative whereby LTTE violence had disrupted the 
‘natural’ order of things on the island and had violated an historic tradition of harmony 
among different groups on the island. Although this discourse is littered with notions of 
democratic rule and pluralistic tolerance, it is in fact quite violent. The pluralist discourse 
seeks to reaffirm state sovereignty in government hands and deny the Tamil community the 
possibility of an independent state.        
 This discourse directed at the international community also overlapped with the 
discourse directed at the domestic populations in Sri Lanka. The pluralist and inclusive 
discourse directed at the Tamil population was constructed by dissociating the Tamil 
community with the LTTE and linking it to a unified Sri Lanka. The Tamil people and the 
land were under the ‘clutches’ (Rajapaksa 2008a, 2009b) and ‘the fascist and dictatorial 
control of the LTTE terrorists’ (Bogollagama 2008b). This invokes ideas of dictatorship, 
brutality and illegitimacy. The LTTE do not govern, but hold the Tamil population ‘hostage,’ 
denying them their democratic rights (Rajapaksa 2009a). Although the LTTE claim to be 
representative of the Tamil population, they are really only representative of a ‘small group;’ 
namely, those who engage in violence against the Sri Lankan state (Rajapaksa 2007).  
 Yet there also exists a contradiction within the government discourse. The pluralist 
discourse directed at the Tamils and international community was inclusive and democratic, 
while the discourse directed at the Sinhalese majority privileged the Sinhalese by re-writing 
history in a favourable light to Sinhalese nationalism. As scholars have shown, Sri Lanka 
historically comprised of three kingdoms, one of which was Tamil (DeVotta 2011: 135). 
Moreover, this pluralistic discourse did not treat each ethnic group as equal. As Rampton 
(2011: 256) has argued, Sinhalese nationalism proclaims ‘territory, state and nation of the 
island compose a bounded unity revolving around a majoritarian axis of Sinhala Buddhist 
religion, language, culture and people.’ Cultural aspects of Sinhalese narratives, such as the 
peasant farmer, were given an important place in government discourse (see Rajapaksa 
2008a; see also Rampton 2011: 258). In an attempt to build a Sinhala dominated nation 
(Rampton 2011: 267) all other minorities, such as Tamils, were placed in an inferior position 
and subordinate to the Sinhalese community (Rampton 2011: 256).    
 In addition to this subject positioning of the LTTE and Tamil community as inferior 
to the Sinhalese, boundaries as to the relationship the LTTE had with Sri Lanka were 
increasingly blurred. The LTTE were represented as a group both inside and outside of Sri 
Lanka. They were inside in a sense that the war was occurring within the geographical 
bounds of the island. Yet by constructing the LTTE as illegitimate rulers who did not 
represent the will of Tamils, they were also cast as outsiders, akin to foreign invaders. By 
representing the LTTE as both an internal and external threat, the Rajapaksa government 
invoked the Sinhalese myths about historic kings defending Sri Lanka against foreign 
invaders. In fact, Rajapaksa used ‘newspaper articles, streamers, giant cutouts, skits, and 
music videos to portray him as the new Dutugemunu [an historic Sinhalese King] destined to 
eradicate terrorism’ (DeVotta 2011: 136). This fit in with the broader narrative of the 
government that the Tamils already have the homeland of Tamil Nadu in India (DeVotta 
2011: 135), further reinforcing the Sinhalese myth that Sri Lanka is the home of the 
Sinhalese.           
 These nationalist discourses helped to position subjects in relation to one another and 
helped in the construction of identities.  By creating a binary opposition between the Sri 
Lankan government and the LTTE, it positioned the subjects in a hierarchy of superior and 
inferior. The Sri Lankan government represented the will of all people, were moral and 
virtuous, and promised economic development and a unified country. Military victory over 
the LTTE was seen as a way to overcome the divisive politics of the previous decades. Yet it 
also equated LTTE terrorism with the broader Tamil project of independence. A U.N. report 
on war crimes during the recent Sri Lankan conflict stated the Sri Lankan government’s 
discourse was ‘couched in terms of Sinhala majoritarianism that presents the defeat of the 
LTTE as the defeat of all Tamil legitimate political aspirations’ (U.N. Secretary-General 
2011: 111). Defeat of the LTTE was not just about maintaining the Sinhalese interpretation of 
history but also about constructing a new future for the island. This image was constructed 
and directed by government to both domestic and international audiences. As I show below, 
by creating the LTTE as an inferior and foreign element that posed a threat to Sri Lankan 
society, these discourses provided an environment that encouraged torture and other acts of 
inhumane violence.          
 However, the LTTE offered a different interpretation of the conflict, seeing it as 
another case of ethnic oppression by the Sinhalese majority. LTTE public statements referred 
to the ‘Sinhalese’ government, making a clear separation between the Tamils and the rest of 
Sri Lanka, arguing the government did not represent the will of the Tamil people 
(Ponnambalam 2006). This was different from the government’s discourse in that it sought to 
challenge the notion promoted by the government that the Tamil community were part of a 
broader Sri Lankan society, rather than a separate community.     
 The LTTE accused the ‘Sinhala leadership’ of ‘ethnic genocide’ and who sought to 
‘destroy the rights of Tamils’ (TamilNet, 2 August 2006). In conflating the government and 
the ‘Sinhala nation’ as one, it promoted a discourse whereby it was the whole country against 
the Tamils who needed to be defeated in war:  
The politics of the Sinhala nation has today taken the form of a monstrous war. 
Because the chauvinistic Sinhala regime is putting its trust in a military solution, the 
war is spreading and is turning more and more intense. Sinhala nation is intent on 
occupying and enslaving the Tamil homeland. Our military is only involved in a war 
of self defence against this war of the Sinhala nation (LTTE 2008). 
The LTTE engaged in similar divisive nationalist discourse as the Sri Lankan government. 
The LTTE claimed the Tamil community could not continue to live under the rule of the 
‘Sinhala nation’ in freedom and dignity. Yet by creating an image of the rest of Sri Lanka as 
a homogenous whole, and whose only quality was the oppression of Tamils, the stark 
divisions and tensions between the two identities further escalated the use of force. As the 
U.N. argued, the ‘extreme Tamil nationalism…reinforced Sinhalese nationalism’ (U.N. 
Secretary-General 2011: 114). Tamil nationalism reaffirmed for the Sinhalese that the LTTE 
were an enemy to Sri Lankan ‘unity’ and represented a group that needed to be destroyed.  
 
 
‘War on Terrorism’  
The second major discourse, and intertwined with the first, revolved around the notion that 
the conflict represented part of the global ‘war on terror.’ Battles against ‘terrorism’ are 
nothing new in Sri Lanka, with the government passing the Prevention of Terrorism Act of 
1979 in response to JVP violence. However, this recent war was targeted exclusively against 
the LTTE, and ‘terrorism’ discourse represented a potent tool in which to justify war. 
 The Sri Lankan government discourse created a binary opposition between itself and 
the LTTE that invoked a battle of good versus evil, and this discourse was communicated to 
the international and domestic audiences. The predicates attributed to the LTTE were not the 
same throughout the temporal period analysed. Common terms used included ‘menace’ 
(Rajapaksa 2008b) ‘terrorist’ (see SCOPP 2006, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2008a, 2008b), 
‘savage’ and ‘ruthless’ (Rajapaksa 2009b) ‘violent’ (Sambandan 2008) and ‘cannot be 
trusted’ (Rajapaksa 2009a). However, although these terms are different they are consistent 
with one another and represent a discourse in the Foucaultian sense. The different statements 
work together to form a strategy that constructs knowledge and produces meaning. The 
common theme that runs through the different statements is one of a violent and law-violating 
actor that seeks to divide and threaten Sri Lanka.      
 The predicates used by the Sri Lankan government to construct its own identity reflect 
the opposite of those used to describe the LTTE. The Sri Lankan government is ‘democratic’ 
(Sambandan 2008; Rajapaksa 2008a; SCOPP 2006, 2007b) and attempts to ‘bring about 
sustainable peace’ (Sambandan 2008) while the military is ‘humane’ (Rajapaksa 2009b) 
‘disciplined’ (Rajapaksa 2007) and ‘restrained’ (Gunawardena 2010). These predicates 
invoke virtuous qualities and allow them to claim themselves to be defenders of Sri Lankan 
society. These predicates link up with the above discourse concerning ethnicity. It casts the 
LTTE as a threatening force that does not represent the Tamil population, while the Sri 
Lankan government is seen as the defenders and legitimate protectors of all Sri Lankans. The 
presuppositions of this discourse assume the 2006-2009 conflict was the result of the LTTE’s 
propensity for war at the expense of the Sri Lankan government’s desire for peace. The 
foreign minister stated in an interview Colombo, September 2008  
We have gone through several phases since President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s tenure 
began in November 2005. We devoted the first phase to talks with the LTTE, 
believing that the talks would lead to a negotiated settlement. That lasted up to 2006. 
The LTTE, in spite of the talks, went about on the normal, violent ways they were 
used to (Sambandan 2008). 
This discourse was directed at both a domestic and international audience and lasted 
throughout the entire conflict between 2006 and 2009. Unlike the Sri Lankan government that 
cast itself as exhausting all peaceful options before returning to war, the LTTE were cast as 
encouraging war. The Sri Lankan government wanted to show the international community 
that the LTTE failed to take peace treaties seriously, treating the Norwegian peace process 
with contempt (Rajapaksa 2008b). They walked out of the talks under the weakest of excuses, 
and reverted back to terrorism (Rajapaksa 2008b). This was because the LTTE’s objective 
was to create a ‘barbaric culture’ within Sri Lanka through the use of violence and terror 
(SCOPP 2008a: 5). The LTTE only understood violence, meaning the LTTE had to be 
eliminated with violence. Showing the overlap in the discourse directed at both a domestic 
and international audience, the foreign minister publicly responded to an LTTE attack by 
declaring in Parliament on 7 October 2008 and again at the Australian Strategic Policy 
Institute in Canberra the following week on the 13 October, 
Yesterday’s attack makes it crystal clear that the LTTE is firmly and irreversibly 
entrenched in the path of violence and terrorism. This is not the time for 
recrimination or finger pointing. No attempt should be made to whitewash the LTTE 
and throw it a life line, as it faces imminent and certain defeat at the hands of our 
valiant security forces. All political parties who subscribe to democracy should unite 
and join hands with the government to once and for all rid Sri Lanka of the scourge of 
terrorism. This barbaric act of terrorism also demonstrates the need for the people to 
remain eternally vigilant, since the LTTE is hell bent on wreaking death and 
destruction on the people of this country (Bogollagama 2008b). 
How is this terrorism discourse linked to the widespread practice of torture? It is linked in 
three ways. First, by making a distinction between the LTTE as terrorists and the broader 
Tamil population, it denied the LTTE as representing any form of community, making brutal 
interventions possible. Describing the LTTE as a ‘scourge,’ the Sri Lankan government 
invoked a term used by the U.S. administration, which links terrorism with notions of disease 
that must be destroyed (Jackson 2007: 363).        
 The predicates used also stripped the LTTE of any moral qualities. While the 
government represented themselves as virtuous and humane, ignoring and denying their own 
human rights violations, the LTTE were cast solely as inhumane. The government focused on 
the LTTE’s immoral and illegal actions such as piracy, recruiting child soldiers, drug 
smuggling, terrorism and looting (SCOPP 2007a, 2007b). The LTTE exploited schools to 
recruit child soldiers, and attacked ships that supplied essential food aid for Sri Lankan 
citizens (such as the Jaffna attack on 6 November 2006) (SCOPP 2007a).  The LTTE showed 
a complete disregard for human life as they ‘indiscriminately’ laid land mines without 
‘concern for international law or civility’ (SCOPP 2007a: 1). Moreover, the LTTE were 
represented as untrustworthy, breaking their pledges not only to the Sri Lankan government 
in the peace process but also to UNICEF after they had made commitments to address 
concerns about child soldiers (SCOPP 2007a).     
 Removing the LTTE from a moral community meant that all types of behaviour 
became possible. The Defence Secretary Gothabaya Rajapaksa stated in June 2007, ‘What I 
am saying is, if there is a terrorist group, why can’t you do anything? It’s not against a 
community…I’m talking about terrorists. Anything is fair’ (Human Rights Watch 2007: 2). 
This placed the LTTE outside of a moral community and opened up the possibility of violent 
practices that would ordinarily be deemed inappropriate in peace time.   
 Second, the Sri Lankan government appealed to the Bush administration’s rhetoric 
that civilized states do not negotiate with terrorists. Although the government engaged in 
negotiations with the LTTE that resulted in the Norwegian-led Cease Fire Agreement in 
2002, by 2006 the government’s position had shifted by arguing that the LTTE could not be 
trusted and therefore were not appropriate or equal partners for peace. Ratnasiri 
Wickremanayake argued that if the western countries were not prepared to negotiate with Bin 
Laden then they should not expect the Sri Lankan government to negotiate with the LTTE 
(TamilNet, 20 May 2008). By declaring that communication was not feasible between the 
government and the LTTE, violence became not only a possibility, but the only feasible 
option left to deal with LTTE attacks.        
 And third, by labelling the conflict a ‘war on terrorism,’ it justified the existence of 
emergency laws that suspended civil liberties and increased police and military powers. The 
Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process (SCOPP 2006: 5) stated in 
November/December 2006, ‘The government will introduce far-reaching measures to curb 
terrorism and terrorist activities by any person or group of persons, in keeping with its policy 
to achieve peace.’ As I discuss these laws in detail below I will not mention them here. 
However, criticisms of these laws were stifled by linking support of these policies with a duty 
to the nation as a whole. Prime Minister Ratnasiri Wickremanayaka stated, ‘The civilians are 
threatened due to the barbaric attacks of the LTTE…It is our duty to support the Security 
Forces to eliminate terrorism’ (SCOPP 2008a: 5). This mimics the Bush administration’s 
black and white worldwide that actors were either with or against the U.S. in its ‘war on 
terror’ (see Bush 2001).          
 The discursive practices employed by the LTTE cast the Sri Lankan government and 
military forces as terrorists. The LTTE described Sri Lankan government actions as forms of 
‘harassment,’ ‘military repression’ (TamilNet, 25 January 2006) and ‘State terrorism’ 
(TamilNet, 18 April 2006). The LTTE challenged its terrorist label by arguing it was 
responding to Sri Lankan terrorism through an ‘Armed struggle for the liberation of 
Tamileelam’ (TamilNet, 18 April 2006). The LTTE saw the recent global ‘war on terrorism’ 
as a guise used by the government to further subjugate the Tamil community (TamilNet, 22 
February 2007).           
 The presupposition based in the LTTE’s discourse was that the recent conflict was a 
continuation of previous practices of oppression against the Tamil community. The LTTE 
argued the ‘Sinhalese nation’ were bent on destroying the Tamil nation and instigated the 
recent war to fulfil this goal since the Sinhalese took hold of power after decolonisation in 
1948 (TamilNet, 22 February 2007). However, even though the LTTE cast themselves as 
protectors of the Tamil community, invoking the threat of State terrorism helped them justify 
atrocities against fellow Tamils as a means to win the war. The U.N. accused the LTTE of 
torture, recruiting child soldiers, forcing civilians to stay in war zones so as to act as a human 
buffer, shooting and killing those that sought to escape from LTTE controlled areas, using 
military arms near civilians, forced labour, and suicide attacks that killed civilians (U.N. 
Secretary-General 2011: 65-66). Moreover, the LTTE undertook an aggressive strategy 
before and during the war to silence critics and ‘traitors’ at home and in the diaspora (Human 
Rights Watch 2006: 17, 18, 24).  This included ‘death threats, beatings, property damage, 
smear campaigns, fabricated criminal charges, and even murder as a consequence of dissent’ 
(Human Rights Watch 2006: 14). One can see here that terrorist discourses were not only a 
means to frame and ‘make sense’ of the current conflict, but were also used as a justification 
to escalate violence.  
 
Making Torture Possible  
These discursive practises at the national level created a context that influenced legislative 
and institutional practices and contributed to creating and sustaining an environment that 
encouraged torture. The background narratives of ethnic hierarchies and the repeated violence 
between different groups informed much of the understanding of how to interpret the recent 
war. The Sri Lankan government constructed the LTTE as a terrorist group unrepresentative 
of the Tamil community that undermined Sri Lankan unity and needed to be destroyed. The 
Sri Lankan government constructed themselves as the saviours of the island and sought to 
defend its sovereignty and rebuild one nation that was to live in peace and harmony. The 
abrogation of the Cease Fire Agreement was justified as an act of self-defence and one of last 
resort, making war appear to be the only feasible option in dealing with the LTTE. 
 The negative language in both the nationalist and terrorist discourse at the national 
level encouraged a further escalation of violence at the local level. Both these discourses 
trapped each actor into seeing the other with enmity and closed off the possibility for peace. 
Although sources that help to thoroughly analyse everyday discourses is minimal due to the 
secret nature of torture, victim accounts of torture in human rights reports provide an insight 
into how certain violent discourses made torture possible amongst Sri Lankan officials.  
 Everyday discourses built upon the ethnic hierarchies of the national discourses but 
were more violent and abusive. Tamils were particularly targeted and de-humanised, with Sri 
Lankan officials likening Tamils to animals using predicates such as ‘dogs’ and ‘Tamil bitch’ 
(Human Rights Watch 2013: 67, 76, 82, 87, 136), a categorisation which has been shown to 
weaken moral restraints and justify inflicting harm (Haslam 2006: 252-253). One victim 
describes how while detained a Sri Lankan officer walked into her cell at night, drunk, and 
began to sexually assault her. The victim recalls how the officer called her a ‘cow’ and told 
her how she ‘must have good milk.’ When she further resisted, the officer became angry, beat 
her and began swearing at her in Sinhala. She was then raped (Human Rights Watch 2013: 
82). These predicates reflect the subject positioning used in the national discourses whereby 
the LTTE were constructed as inferior and worthy of punishment.    
 The everyday discourses in the torture rooms also reinforced the presuppositions that 
Sinhala was the main language of Sri Lanka. Sri Lankan officers spoke little or no Tamil to 
Tamil detainees, and when Tamil was used it was abusive or slang (Human Rights Watch 
2013: 60, 67). When victims were raped they were also spoken to in Sinhala, a language they 
often did not understand, reinforcing the superiority and dominance of the Sinhala ‘nation’ 
over the Tamil ‘nation’ (Human Rights Watch 2013: 121, 132). This dominance was again 
reinforced when officers would force Tamil detainees to sign ‘confessions’ written in Sinhala 
(Human Rights Watch 2013: see 51-138), excluding the Tamil language from playing a role 
in the Sri Lankan justice system. This demonstrates the national and local discourses were not 
separate. The national discourse created the conditions of government and Sinhalese 
superiority and the idea that resort to violence was the only means to deal with LTTE 
suspects.           
 National discourses were connected to everyday practices of torture in a second way. 
The construction of a war environment set the grounding for the reintroduction of emergency 
laws. Apart from 1989, Sri Lanka has been under emergency rule from 1983 to 2001 (U.N. 
Secretary-General 2011: 10). The emergency laws were re-introduced in 2005 and ended in 
August 2011, well after the war had officially ended (Amnesty International 2011: 6).  The 
emergency laws consisted of the Public Security Ordinance, No. 25 of 1947, a colonial-era 
law (U.N. Secretary-General 2011: 96) and The Prevention of Terrorism Act of 1979 (PTA). 
These laws increased the power of state officials and justified suspension of presumption of 
innocence, indefinite detention, arrest without charge, immunity for officers acting ‘in good 
faith,’ restrictions on judicial checks on the exercise of power, and the disposal of bodies 
without public notification (Amnesty International 2011: 16-17; Human Rights Watch 2008: 
38; Tamil Information Centre 2011; U.N. Secretary-General 2011: 97).    
 The emergency laws and the PTA have given a sense of impunity to Sri Lankan 
officials and help explain the widespread and routine use of torture. Sri Lankan army and 
police often saw themselves as above the law and this often justified inhumane acts such as 
torture. The Rapporteur noted that a torture victim was told by the Sri Lankan torturers: ‘we 
are the bosses and we can do what we want’ (U.N. Human Rights Council 2008: 48). In 
another instance, a prisoner was transferred to the TID where they asked him if he had been 
beaten. When he replied yes, the officer stated ‘we will also beat you’ (U.N. Human Rights 
Council 2008: 30). This discourse linked up with the everyday discursive practices mentioned 
above by buttressing the subject positioning of the Sri Lankan officer who had agency to act 
and to hurt, and the detainees, which were stripped of agency, and became animals to be 
beaten.            
 A culture of impunity is nothing new but represents a continuity of long-established 
practices in Sri Lanka. Amnesty International documented in 1994 how a victim was told 
after his head was smashed against a wall by Sri Lankan torturers that ‘we will come back 
and you must tell the truth, otherwise you will not be alive; no one knows what is happening 
here’ (Amnesty International 1994: 13). This impunity and encouragement of torture as a 
counter-terrorism strategy was made possible by the lack of punishment for torturers. 
Prosecutions for torture are low with only 3 prosecutions between 1994 and 2008 (Amnesty 
International 2011: 19). Yet between 1998 and 2011, 1,500 cases of torture were reported to 
the Asian Human Rights Commission (Amnesty International 2011: 19; Asian Human Rights 
Commission 2011). Officers accused of torture are often not removed from their posts, 
allowing them to use their position to influence the case against them (U.N. Secretary-
General 2011: 99-100). And the burden of proof is often on the victims to show that the 
confessions they gave were not under conditions of duress or coercion (U.N. Committee 
against Torture 2010: 4-5).          
 The increasing allegations of torture and the conduct of military operations were a 
concern for the government as it challenged their ‘humane’ image. Although the everyday 
discourses demonstrated that Sri Lankan officers felt few moral restraints to beat detainees 
that came into their custody, officials were aware that such practices would not be tolerated 
by the international community. In March 2007, Victor Perera, the Inspector General of 
Police, stated, ‘There is a lot of attention by foreign organizations on the human rights 
situation here and these killings and abductions cause big problems for the government 
internationally’ (Human Rights Watch 2007: 61). The government dealt with this in three 
ways. First, it attempted to maintain the secrecy of torture. The U.N. Committee against 
Torture has condemned secret detentions in which it says torture is alleged to have occurred 
(U.N. Committee against Torture 2010:  3).        
 Second, the government outsourced illegal practices to paramilitary groups. A leaked 
U.S. diplomatic document shows the purpose of the paramilitaries in the counter-terrorist 
operations. The paramilitaries were to compete with the LTTE in recruitment; kidnap and kill 
individuals in Colombo suspected of links to the LTTE; and silence critics. Even though 
elements in the military wanted to ‘clamp down’ on the paramilitary groups, they had ‘orders 
from Defense Secretary Gothabaya Rajapaksa to not interfere with the paramilitaries on the 
grounds that they are doing ‘work’ that the military cannot do because of international 
scrutiny’ (U.S. Department for SCA/INS, 2007).      
 And third, the government tightened its control over access of reporters to war zones. 
On 5 September 2008, the Defence Secretary told humanitarian organisations to leave the 
Vanni region on the grounds that the government could not guarantee their security (Human 
Rights Watch 2008: 34-35).
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 The government has also used intimidation and threats to 
prevent human rights groups from publishing critical material on the war (U.N. Secretary-
General 2011: 11). Human Rights Watch has argued that these restrictions and intimidation 
tactics reduced human rights protections for individuals in the war (Human Rights Watch 
2008: 36-45).           
 The cultural myths and discourse on terrorism did not explicitly condone torture but it 
created an environment that encouraged its use. The emergency laws and the creation of 
subject positioning whereby the Sri Lankan government was deemed superior and virtuous 
compared to the inferior and dangerous LTTE helped make possible the escalation of 
violence. The national discourses helped facilitate the police-level discourses that overrode 
the prohibitions against torture.  
 
Conclusion  
The recent Sri Lankan war against the LTTE from 2006 to 2009 saw the use of torture on 
both sides. I have focused primarily on how it was possible for the Sri Lankan government to 
torture by looking at the conditions that enabled such violence. The Sri Lankan government 
implicitly invoked Sinhalese cultural myths and discourses concerning the fight against 
terrorism to help legitimise a return to war with the LTTE. Although these national 
discourses did not explicitly condone torture, I have argued they had a connection with the 
everyday practices of police and army torture by creating emergency conditions that 
suspended civil liberties and created ethnic hierarchies that treated the Tamils as inferior.  
 In examining the use of torture in the recent war, I have sought to address how-
possible questions. I have used a discursive practices approach to show how actors in the Sri 
Lankan conflict were constructed as enemies that needed to be destroyed. The discursive 
practices approach has the advantage over the psychodynamic approach by treating identities 
as fluid, allowing one to understand how Tamils could torture Tamils and Sinhalese could 
torture Sinhalese.         
 Although I have focused primarily on how the Sri Lankan government tortured during 
the recent war, I have also shown that the LTTE engaged in similar tactics, even against their 
own people. The LTTE employed nationalist and terrorist discourses to help demonise the Sri 
Lankan government but also to justify their own violence. Yet many of the victims of this 
war were those innocent civilians, mainly Tamils, who were subjected to untold violence by 
the government and the LTTE, both of whom claimed to be their true representatives. As part 
of their war propaganda, each side engaged in a discourse of un-truth that sought to promote 
their own side as humane while trying to hide their war crimes and torture from the 
international community.          
 The prospects for ameliorating such harm in Sri Lanka in the immediate future look 
bleak. In the post-war period, the U.N. has argued that by refusing to admit that many 
innocent lives were lost in the Vanni region during the war, as well as ‘intimidating and 
threatening those who challenge that view, the Government is effectively closing off the 
opportunity to open a serious, national dialogue on the recent past and the needs of the future’ 
(U.N. Secretary-General 2011: 111).        
 The Rajapaksa government continues to engage in exclusionary policies that reaffirm 
the nationalist discourse that Sri Lanka is an island for Sinhalese. The national anthem is sung 
in Sinhalese, excluding the rights of Tamils to sing it in their own language (DeVotta 2011: 
141; U.N. Secretary-General 2011: 112). Moreover, there is an effective ‘colonization of the 
northeast’ of the island (DeVotta 2011: 141). Monuments and cemeteries for the LTTE are 
being destroyed; Tamil village names are being changed to Sinhalese names; Tamils are 
being relocated to other parts of the country; and Buddhist monuments and temples are being 
erected in areas with no Buddhist population (DeVotta 2011: 141). There is also the 
continued use of paramilitary organisations in the North East intimidating the population 
(DeVotta 2011: 142; U.N. Secretary-General 2011: 112-113).     
 The defeat of the LTTE has not brought an end to ethnic tensions, especially with 
strong nationalist beliefs held among the Sinhalese population and the Tamil diaspora (U.N. 
Secretary General 2011: 114). The creation of categories of superior and inferior human 
beings alongside the suspension of civil liberties has created conditions for the possibility of 
extreme violence such as torture. Unless these categories are addressed, and each group 
begins to see one another as equal, violence such as torture could continue to be a real 
possibility in Sri Lanka for years to come.  
 
Notes 
1. See U.N. Human Rights Council (2008: 10-19) for an overview of national laws and commissions 
relating to preventing torture. 
2. These include: ‘the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); the Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment and Punishment (CAT); the 
Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW); the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD); and the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)’ (U.N. Human Rights Council 2008: 10). 
3. Perera (2007a: 147) conducted a study in the 1990s and found that 68 methods of torture were used 
in Sri Lanka. 95% of the time blunt objects were used on the victims, including ‘broom sticks, wicket 
stumps, chair and table legs, wooden sticks, iron rods, police batons to PVC pipes (locally called ‘S’ 
lone pipes) filled with sand or cement.’ See also Perera (2007b). 
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